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ABSTRACT
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the only interdomain routing
protocol employed on the internet. It allows tens of thousands of Autonomous Sys-
tems (ASes) to exchange routing information while implementing economic and or-
ganizational policies. However, conflicting policies between ASes can cause routing
instability and/or unpredictable routing solutions. A system of routers is robust if
routing tables always converge predictably, despite router and link failures. We pursue
an approach to guarantee BGP robustness through operational guidelines. Existing
guidelines for BGP robustness are essentially geared toward satisfying the same suffi-
cient condition for BGP robustness developed by Griffin and Wilfong. In this thesis,
we first show that there exists a weaker sufficient condition for BGP robustness. We
then discuss how new guidelines for configuring BGP with a guarantee of robustness
may be derived from this new condition. Additionally, we compare various models of
BGP behavior and show that the models do not always have equivalent results and
sometimes have completely different behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the only interdomain routing
protocol employed on the internet. It allows hundreds of thousands of autonomous
systems (ASes) to interconnect by providing a common protocol to share network
reachability information. Within an autonomous system, shortest path routing pro-
tocols are sensible. They provide a predictable method of routing network traffic and
usually provide optimal routing. However, using shortest path heuristics to route
traffic between autonomous systems is unattractive. Each AS is administered by an
organizational entity that may have a range of economic and organizational incen-
tives. Because the goal of many ASes is to earn income by providing internet service,
these incentives vary widely between ASes. Furthermore, even an AS which does not
seek to gain financially, may wish to limit unnecessary network traffic flow so that it
maintains an acceptable level of service to its users. The incentives of ASes can be
expressed in terms of network policies. The varying policies between ASes create the
need for a protocol which does not rely on shortest path routing.
BGP has been widely successful because it gives network administrators the
ability to interconnect with other ASes and implement their organization’s policies.
Unfortunately, the ability of BGP to implement organizational policies may also lead
to routing oscillations and unpredictable routing solutions [Ref. 24] when ASes have
conflicting policies. We describe a system of routers as robust if routing tables always
converge predictably, under any set of router and link failures.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF BGP ROBUSTNESS
Robustness is crucial for the performance of the internet infrastructure. Persis-
tent routing oscillations may significantly impact end-to-end performance, resulting
in increased latency and dropped packets. Persistent routing oscillations also make
it difficult for network operators to identify, debug, and correct undesirable rout-
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ing instances. Furthermore, robustness is crucial for maintaining predictable routing
behavior. If routing behavior is unpredictable, optimal routing may not be achieved.
B. SUMMARY OF THIS PAPER
A number of approaches have been pursued to address BGP instability. This
paper investigates achieving robustness of eBGP sessions by implementing local and
global constraints. Using the stable paths problem as a framework for BGP polices
[Ref. 12], we investigate and compare various BGP models to show that they do not
always match each other. We present new sufficient condition for robustness, that
is weaker than any previously published condition. We pursue devising constraints
which guarantee this condition. We also apply our results using the class-based path-
vector system [Ref. 18].
C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Chapter II gives a tutorial of BGP. We introduce BGP and the services that
it provides. We describe how routers establish BGP sessions and describe the various
messages that can be exchanged. We discuss how BGP allows operators to implement
network policy. We discuss how routers use BGP to store, select, and advertise routes.
We define three major design goals of BGP: autonomy, expressiveness, and robustness.
We detail how permanent routing oscillations may arise from conflicting policies. We
discuss route flap dampening as the current solution to address BGP oscillations.
Chapter III presents background work that addresses achieving BGP robust-
ness. We review the main approaches to making BGP robust. We discuss why we
pursue an approach to achieving BGP robustness that relies on operational guidelines
and global constraints. We give a summary of related work on BGP. We reintroduce
the stable paths problem as a framework to model policies and routing solutions of
BGP systems. We define solvability as the existence of a stable routing assignment.
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We describe three models of BGP behavior: the simple path vector protocol, the
single node activation sequence model, and the multiple node activation sequence
model. For each model we define safety. We reintroduce the dispute wheel as a
sufficient condition for the robustness of the stable paths problem. A dispute wheel
represents a set of mutually conflicting policies. We discuss the hierarchical BGP
model which describes local and global constraints on ASes to guarantee robustness.
We reintroduce the class-based path-vector system which describes generalized local
and global constraints on ASes that guarantee robustness.
Chapter IV compares the three models of BGP behavior. We describe how the
models match each other in terms of achieving similar successive path assignments
when given the same instance of the stable paths problem and initial routing tables.
We prove that while some models match each other, others do not. We compare the
definitions of safety between the different models. We prove that while the definition
of safety in one model may imply safety in another, this is not true for all models.
Chapter V gives our main result. We motivate our result by an instance of the
stable paths problem which is robust, but contains a dispute wheel. We introduce a
new condition on instances of the stable paths problem. We prove that this condition
is robust, and weaker than previously published conditions. We investigate applying
our result using the class-based path-vector system framework. We pursue devising
broader guidelines to guarantee robustness, despite the presence of a dispute wheel.
Chapter VI gives conclusions and future work.
3
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II. TUTORIAL OF BGP
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the only interdomain routing
protocol employed on the internet. The internet connects tens of thousands of au-
tonomous systems (ASes). An AS is a collection of routers controlled by a single
entity, such as a local ISP or university. It is also common for very large organiza-
tions to operate more than one AS. Each AS is given a globally unique number called
the autonomous system number (ASN). Inside an AS an interior gateway protocol
(IGP) such as RIP and OSPF is used to determine routes. However, ASes communi-
cate with each other using BGP, making BGP an interdomain protocol. Specifically,
BGP gives each AS the ability to (1) obtain reachability information from neighboring
ASes (2) propagate routing information and (3) choose routes based on reachability
and policy [Ref. 22]. Unlike OSPF or RIP, routes in BGP are not usually determined
by shortest path metrics. ASes often have various economic incentives. Because BGP
gives network administrators an enormous amount of control over how routes are ad-
vertised to neighboring ASes and how routes are chosen, BGP is often referred to as
“policy-based” routing.
Figure 1. An Small Scale Example of Internet Routing
To begin a BGP session, a BGP speaker establishes a TCP connection on
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port 179 with another BGP speaker and sends an OPEN message. There are two
types of BGP sessions. An interior border gateway protocol (iBGP) session allows
an autonomous system to propagate routing information within itself. An exterior
border gateway protocol (eBGP) session allows an autonomous system to share rout-
ing information with a different AS, also known as an external peer. See Figure 1
for a small scale example of routing protocols used on the internet. For the purposes
of this paper, we will ignore the complexities of iBGP and assume that each AS has
completely uniform routing information at any given time. Therefore, we consider
each AS as a single entity or node that has eBGP sessions with external peers.
Once a BGP session has been established, several types of messages are sent
between BGP speakers. KEEPALIVE messages are periodically to ensure that the
connection is alive. NOTIFICATION messages are sent in response to errors or
special conditions. UPDATE messages are used to advertise routes between BGP
speakers. A route is a set of destinations with information about the path to those
destinations. UPDATE messages send information about routes by using the Network
Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) field and the path attributes field[Ref. 22].
The path attributes field of an UPDATE message allows BGP speakers to
share detailed information about routes. We will briefly discuss some of the most
important attribute types, including AS PATH, ORIGIN, MULTI EXIT DISC, and
LOCAL PREF. The mandatory AS PATH attribute informs the local BGP speaker
of which ASes carried the routing information to the local speaker. If this routing
information has not changed, these same ASes will carry any traffic sent to the route’s
destination. The ability to share the AS PATH parameter makes BGP a path-vector
protocol. When an AS shares reachability information about a destination to one of
its neighbors, it shares the entire path of ASes to the destination. This helps prevent
routing loops, because no path will ever be accepted if it crosses through the same
AS number twice. The mandatory ORIGIN attribute identifies whether the original
source of routing information was from an interior gateway protocol, the exterior
6
gateway protocol, or unknown. The optional MULTI EXIT DISC (MED) attribute is
passed between external peers and allows a local AS to discriminate between multiple
entry and exit points to the same neighboring AS. The LOCAL PREF attribute must
be included in any UPDATE message between internal peers. This attribute helps
an AS rank paths and maintain consistent rankings throughout the AS.
As discussed above, BGP is policy-based routing. BGP operators use rankings
and filters to implement their policies. A BGP speaker may have a multiple routes
to a single destination available. Rankings determine which of these routes should
be used. Also, an AS may not want to share all of its routes with an external peer.
Export filters allow an AS to place controls on the routes advertised to external peers.
Conversely, an AS may not want to use some of the routes that it has received. Import
filters allow an AS to not use specified routes.
Rankings are determined from a large number or factors. Phase 1 of the
decision process is decision function that is invoked whenever a BGP speaker recieves
an UPDATE message, from a peer, that advertises a new route, a relacement route, or
a withdrawn route. Phase 1 calculates the degree of preference for each newly recieved
or replaced route. If the route is learned via an iBGP session, either the LOCAL REF
attribute is is taken as the degree of preference or the degree of preference is computed
based on preconfigured policy information. If the route is learned via an eBGP session,
then the degree of preference is based on preconfigured policy information. [Ref. 22].
Phase 2 of the decision process is invoked immediately after Phase 1 and
determines which routes should be used by a BGP speaker. AS loops are detected
by scanning the full AS path of each route and making sure that none of these ASNs
matches that of the local system. [Ref. 22]. Also, if a route becomes inaccessible, it
can not be used. Once these routes have been eliminated, the highest ranked route
is selected by the following rules in their exact order [Ref. 22]:
1. Prefer the path with the largest local preference.
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2. Remove from consideration all paths that are not tied for having the largest
local preference.
3. Prefer the path that passes through the smallest number of ASes.
4. Remove from consideration all paths that are not tied for passing through the
smallest number of ASes.
5. Prefer the path that has the lowest Origin number.
6. Remove from consideration all paths that are not tied for having the lowest
Origin number.
7. Prefer the path with the lowest MED attribute.
8. Remove from consideration all paths that are not tied for having the lowest
MED attribute.
9. If at least one path was received via EGP, remove from consideration all paths
that were received via IGP.
10. Prefer the route with the most preferred interior cost.
11. Remove from consideration all paths that are not tied from having the the
most preferred interior cost.
12. Prefer the route with the lowest BGP identifier value.
13. Prefer the path with the lowest external peer IP address.
Within an AS, BGP speakers may assign routes a specific local preference
value, based on criteria such as AS PATH. Because local preference is the first at-
tribute inspected in the decision process, this ability allows every AS to rank all routes
in any arbitrary order.
A BGP speaker may be configured to filter routes in a number of ways. Filters
may be specified by ASNs occurring in a route’s the AS PATH attribute and/or the
route’s destination address. Filters may be applied to prevent a route from entering
the router’s routing information base. This would prevent a specified route from ever
being selected. Filters may also be applied to prevent a route from being sent in an
UPDATE message to an external peer.
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Now that we have discussed ranking and filtering, we discuss a conceptual
model of how BGP stores, selects, and advertises routes. There are three conceptually
distinct storage tables for routes. The Adj-RIBs-In table contains all unprocessed
routes that have been received from peers. The Loc-RIB table contains each actual
route used locally for all available destinations. This is determined by applying import
filters and rankings. The Adj-RIBs-Out contains the routing information that will
be shared with neighbors in outgoing UPDATE messages. Suppose a BGP speaker
receives a route from a peer in an UPDATE message. The BGP speaker will store
the route in the Adj-RIBs-In table. Next, the BGP speaker will undergo its decision
process to determine if this received route should be used. Routes which should
be filtered and routes which have a repeated ASN are eliminated from the decision
process. The router will use its ranking rules to determine whether the received route
is now the highest ranked route to a destination. If this is the case, the received will
replace the existing route in the Loc-RIB table and the BGP speaker will begin routing
traffic towards the first hop of the new route. Finally, export filters are applied to
determine whether the route should be advertised to neighbors. If the route is eligible
to be advertised to neighbors, the route will be updated with new attributes such as
AS PATH and NEXT HOP. The updated route and eligible neighbors will be stored
in the Adj-RIBS-Out table. UPDATE messages will be sent containing the updated
route.
Routes may also be withdrawn in three different ways. If a route is withdrawn,
the route must be deleted from Adj-RIBS-In, Loc-RIB, and Adj-RIBS-Out. If a BGP
speaker deletes any route from the Adj-RIBS-Out table, it must inform its neighbors
that this route is no longer available. A route can be withdrawn by sending an
UPDATE message with the route placed in the WITHDRAWN ROUTES field. A
route can be withdrawn by advertising a new route that contains the same NLRI. A
route can be withdrawn by closing the BGP connection.
The ability of BGP to function as a policy-based protocol leads us to introduce
9
two major design goals of BGP, autonomy and expressiveness. Autonomy is the
ability of network operators to make policy decisions without coordinating with other
ASes. Without a large amount of autonomy, network operators may have to update
their policies when the BGP configurations of neighboring ASes change. Furthermore,
without a large amount of autonomy, network administrators of different ASes may be
forced into a situation where they must disclose some of their policies to each other.
Due to economic incentives, network operators often require that they keep their BGP
policies private. Expressiveness is the ability of network operators to specify network
policy in a flexible manner. For instance, shortest-path routing does not provide
enough expressiveness, because it can’t capture the economic relationships between
many ASes such as customer, provider, and peer [Ref. 5] [Ref. 11].
In general, BGP operators configure policies in line with their organization’s
economic incentives, which are determined by agreements with neighboring ASes.
Many agreements between ASes can be characterized as either a peer-to-peer rela-
tionship or a customer-provider relationship [Ref. 17]. In a peer-to-peer relationship,
two neighboring ASes benefit from exchanging traffic between each other’s customers.
When BGP relationships are discussed, the word “peer” will refer to an AS which
is following a peer-to-peer agreement with a neighboring AS. In a customer-provider
relationship, one neighbor takes on the role of customer and the other takes on the
role of provider. The customer pays the provider for access to internet destinations
that could not be otherwise obtained [Ref. 8]. If an organization has such agreements,
network operators may implement an economically advantageous policy by adhering
to the following rules:
1. An AS can advertise only the routes of itself and its customers to a provider
or peer.
2. An AS can advertise all known routes to its customers.
The first rule prevents an AS from carrying traffic without receiving compen-
sation or benefit. The second rule allows a provider to inform its customers of routes
10
so that it may receive compensation for carrying traffic.
Routing Oscillations occur when routers exchange streams of routing updates
that do not reflect any change to network topology or configuration. Some oscillations,
such as the RIP v1 count to infinity problem, eventually end after a large amount
of unnecessary information has been exchanged. An oscillation that will eventually
end is known as a transient oscillation. Permanent oscillations occur when routers
exchange endless streams of routing updates, and may be created by conflicting BGP
policies or iBGP configurations. Routing oscillations may use up router processing
power, increase network latency, cause forwarding loops and partition the network
[Ref. 25]. Furthermore, oscillations can be exacerbated by failed links as well as
complicate the diagnosis and debugging of network problems [Ref. 23]. Finally,
routing oscillations may significantly affect the increasing number of streaming media
applications on the internet today.
Some BGP oscillations may arise from iBGP configurations alone. Clustering-
induced divergence occurs when an interaction between route reflection clustering and
intradomain routing costs causes permanent oscillations [Ref. 15]. This anomaly may
occur even when eBGP configuration is robust. Griffin et al [Ref. 15] gave a sufficient
condition to solve this problem, which is based upon restricting the choices of paths
at some routers. In another type of iBGP anomaly, MED-induced divergence occurs
when an interaction between MED values, route reflection clustering, and intradomain
routing costs causes permanent oscillations [Ref. 2]. Musunuri and Cobb proposed
routing protocols that would eliminate this anomaly [Ref. 20] .
Besides oscillations occurring from iBGP, eBGP may also cause oscillations.
When multiple BGP speakers have conflicting routing policies, there may be perma-
nent oscillations. To see how router configuration may lead to permanent routing
oscillations, consider a case where there are four eBGP speakers named “0”, “1”, “2”,
and “3” with the unique ASNs 100, 101, 102, and 103 respectively. The system has
the configuration as depicted in Figure 2. We are interested in routing a particular
11
packet to a destination d inside ASN 0. Therefore, we are interested in routes that
have an AS Path that ends in 100. With that in mind, each router is configured to
have the routes and preferences as depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 2. Configuration
Figure 3. Available Routes
The router configurations can be described as follows. Router 0 exports all
routes to routers 1, 2, and 3. Router 1 exports all routes to routers 0, 1, and 2.
Router 1 filters all routes received from router 3 and filters the single route received
from router 2 that has the AS Path 101 102 103 100. Router 1 prefers the route with
the AS Path 101 102 100 to the route with the AS Path 101 100. Router 2 exports
all routes to routers 0, 1, and 3. Router 2 filters all routes received from router 1 and
12
filters the single route received from router 3 that has the AS Path 102 103 101 100.
Router 2 prefers the route with AS Path 102 103 100 to the route with AS Path 102
100. Router 3 exports all routes to routers 0, 1, and 2. Router 3 filters all routes
received from router 2 and filters the single route received from router 1 with AS
Path 103 101 102 100. Router 3 prefers the route with AS Path 103 101 100 to the
route with AS path 103 100. For an example configuration file for router 1, see the
appendix.
Figure 4. The Steps in the Permanent Oscillation
The router configuration discussed above will always give rise to permanent
routing oscillations. We will go through a sequence of routing updates to show the
permanent oscillations as depicted in Figure 4.
1. Router 1 routes through router 2 to router 0. Router 2 routes directly to router
0. Router 3 routes directly to router 0. Also, an UPDATE message has been
sent from router 3 to router 2, informing router 2 of its new route to router 0.
However, router 2 has not received this message yet.
2. Router 2 receives and processes the UPDATE message from router 3. Router
2 changes its route to route through router 3 to router 0. Router 2 sends an
UPDATE message to router 1 informing router 1 of its new route. However,
router 1 has not processed this message yet.
13
3. Router 1 receives and processes the UPDATE message from router 2. Router
1’s current route to router 0 through router 2 is no longer available and the
new route received from router 2 is filtered. Therefore router 1 changes its
route and routes directly to router 0. Router 1 sends an UPDATE message to
router 3 informing router 3 of its new route.
4. Router 3 receives and processes the UPDATE message from router 1. Router
3 changes its route and routes through router 1. Router 3 sends and UPDATE
message to router 2 informing router 2 of its new route.
5. Router 2 receives and processes the UPDATE message from router 3. Router
2’s current route to router 0 is no longer available. Router 2 changes its route
to route directly to router 0. Router 2 sends an UPDATE message to router
1 informing router 1 of its new route.
6. Router 1 receives and processes the update message from router 2. Router 1
changes its route and routes through router 2. Router 1 sends an UPDATE
message to router 3 informing router 3 of its new route.
7. Router 3 receives and processes the update message from router 1. Router 3’s
current route is no longer available. Router 3 changes its route to route directly
to router 0. Router 3 sends an UPDATE message to router 2 informing router
2 of its new route. Note that at the end of step 7 we are in the exact same
state as in the end of step 1.
Because Step 1 and Step 7 result in the exact same state, this process will
repeat itself indefinitely. If a system of routers is always guaranteed to converge and
stop changing routes, no matter what order messages are processed in, the system is
known as safe. The example we have just examined is not safe. Solvability is another
characteristic of systems of BGP routers that does not always hold. A system of
routers is solvable if there exists a set of system wide routing tables where if any
router receives a correct UPDATE message, that router will not change its current
routing table. The example we have just examined is not solvable. Unique solvabil-
ity is a more stringent characteristic where there is exactly one set of system-wide
routing tables that are solvable. If a system of routers is uniquely solvable and safe,
the system is guaranteed to converge in a predictable manner.
Now that BGP oscillations have been discussed, we introduce robustness as
the third major design goal of BGP. Robustness is a characteristic where router con-
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figuration can not lead to routing oscillations and must always produce a predictable,
unique routing solution, under any set of link and router failures. For BGP to be
robust, constraints must be put on the expressiveness and autonomy of the protocol
[Ref. 11].
In order to minimize the effects of BGP oscillations, route flap dampening
[Ref. 25] is often employed. Route flap dampening is an extension to BGP that allows
routers to maintain information on the stability of individual routes. A BGP speaker
will suppress routes that show a large degree of instability. Also, fixed timers may
be used to slow route advertisement. While route flap dampening may successfully
minimize some of the adverse effects of oscillations, it does not provide a complete
solution. Route flap dampening causes oscillations to run in slow motion and does
not guarantee that routing tables will converge to a predictable, unique solution.
In this chapter, we have examined how BGP uses rankings and filterings to
select routes and implement network policy. We have described how conflicts in
policies may create BGP oscillations.
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III. BACKGROUND WORK
A. APPROACHES TO MAKING EBGP ROBUST
There are currently three main approaches to address the instability of eBGP
[Ref. 12]. The approaches consist of operational guidelines for BGP operators, static
analysis of routing policies, and modification of the BGP protocol.
If every BGP operator followed the same set of operational guidelines, it is
possible to prove the robustness of BGP for certain sets of guidelines. For instance,
if every BGP operator configured policies using route filtering alone, BGP is guaran-
teed to be a robust protocol [Ref. 12]. Another flexible, but complex set of robust
guidelines are proposed by Gao and Rexford [Ref. 8].
There are a number of downsides to relying on operational guidelines. First,
not all BGP operators may follow such operational guidelines. A set of operational
guidelines may not capture every policy that BGP operators may be interested in im-
plementing or BGP operators may ignore operational guidelines altogether. Second,
the set of robust operational guidelines may be overly strict. There may exist config-
urations of routers that are robust, despite the fact they do not implement any known
operational guidelines. Third, operational guidelines may require BGP operators to
disclose some amount of policy with each other in order to check global constraints.
For reasons already noted, most BGP operators are very reluctant to disclose their
configurations with each other.
In another approach, BGP robustness could be achieved by static analysis of
router configurations. Such a solution would analyze the configuration of all BGP
speakers and look for policy conflicts. This solution has been proposed by Govindan
et al. [Ref. 10]. There are at least two major drawbacks to this approach. First,
BGP operators would have to disclose the policies and configurations of their AS with
each other. For economical reasons, most BGP operators are very reluctant to disclose
their configurations. Second, such an approach is likely to be intractable, without any
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heuristic procedure to check convergence properties or constraints on ASes. Griffin
and Wilfong have shown that checking for global convergence conditions is either
NP-complete or NP-hard [Ref. 16].
In the final approach, the BGP protocol could be modified to suppress or
prevent eBGP oscillations. This approach is sometimes referred to as a dynamic
approach, because it happens at run-time. As discussed in Chapter II, the route-flap
dampening [Ref. 25] can suppress eBGP oscillations. Unfortunately, this approach
only makes oscillations run in slow motion and does not guarantee that BGP will
converge to a predictable, unique solution.
More extensive modifications to BGP have also been proposed. Griffin and
Wilfong propose a modification to BGP where an attribute called path history is
used to identify paths whose histories contain cycles. This attribute is exchanged
between BGP speakers. Once these paths have been identified, the modified protocol
can also suppress such paths [Ref. 14]. Another somewhat similar modification to
BGP has been proposed by Tien Ee et al. [Ref. 4]. They proposed a mechanism
whereby route advertisements are tagged by a global precedence value. When a BGP
speaker advertises this route to its neighbors, it will increment this value by a number
corresponding to its LOCAL PREF for that route. If permanent BGP oscillations
occur, routers will rely on these global precedence values instead of the local degree
of preference, creating a stable path assignment.
There are several drawbacks to solutions which modify BGP. First, in the
two previous BGP modifications discussed, every BGP speaker must implement the
proposed protocol to prevent BGP oscillations. There are hundreds of thousands
of BGP speakers deployed on the internet today and operators may be unwilling to
update their routers to new standards. Second, protocol modifications that suppress
routes dynamically are unpredictable by nature. Often, it is impossible to predict
exactly which BGP speaker will begin suppressing routes related to permanent oscil-
lations, eliminating the possibility of robustness. Finally, protocol modifications that
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suppress routes involved in conflicting policies often sacrifice a large degree of trans-
parency [Ref. 11]. Transparency is the ability of BGP operators to to understand
how the policies they have written affect the routing protocol and routing tables.
When dynamic solutions suppress routes, it becomes difficult for BGP operators to
maintain and debug routing policies.
Based upon the above discussion, we pursue an approach that relies on oper-
ational guidelines along with global constraints in order to achieve robustness.
B. RELATED WORK
Bertsekas [Ref. 1] proved that the distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm con-
verges. Because BGP has the ability to employ policy based routing, this proof of
shortest path routing does not apply to BGP in general.
Varadhan et al. [Ref. 24] first observed that conflicting policies in BGP con-
figuration could lead to persistent routing oscillations. Furthermore, they introduced
the concept of safety, by defining an AS as “safe” if the policy of an AS does not cause
oscillations. They also speculated that only shortest path route selection is provably
safe.
Labovitz et al. [Ref. 19] presented results from a two year long study of inter-
net routing convergence. They discussed the theoretical upperbound of convergence
time for certain systems. They showed that when routing faults were injected into
the internet, convergence took much longer than previously thought.
Feigenbaum, Sami, and Shenker [Ref. 6] showed that systems with next hop
rankings always have at least one stable routing. However, because of the distributed
nature of BGP, such systems are not guaranteed to converge to a stable routing. We
give an example such a system in Figure 10.
Gao and Rexford [Ref. 8] introduced sufficient conditions on topology, filter-
ing, and rankings to guarantee routing stability and safety. These conditions reflect
the real-world configuration of autonomous systems. They introduced and defined
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the activation sequence in order to model the behavior of BGP. They developed a
system of constraints based upon the principle that every autonomous system should
regard each of its neighbors as either a provider, a customer, or a peer. Furthermore,
they defined a series of constraints based on each of these relationships. Finally,
they proved that if every AS follows these constraints, stable internet routing can be
achieved without global coordination. Unfortunately, ASes do not always follow such
guidelines. Further work by Gao [Ref. 7] showed that some small ISPs do not follow
the guidelines.
Griffin, Shepherd, and Wilfong [Ref. 12] introduced the dispute wheel as a
sufficient condition for robustness. They defined the stable paths problem (SPP),
which is discussed in more detail in this chapter. They also used the simple path
vector protocol (SPVP) [Ref. 9] to model the behavior of BGP. They showed that
determining the solvability of SPP is an NP-complete problem. Furthermore, they
introduced the dispute wheel. They proved that the absence of a dispute wheel is a
sufficient condition for SPP solvability, safety, and robustness.
Griffin, Jaggard, and Ramachandran [Ref. 11] introduced a framework to
describe class-based path-vector systems. They detailed a method where matrices
are used to describe the scoping (also known as filtering) and ranking rules of an
AS based upon its relationships with neighboring ASes and hierarchical level. They
showed how the framework could be used to describe conditions on relationships
like those proposed by Gao and Rexford [Ref. 8]. They also discussed the design
goals for path-vector protocols like BGP. They showed that in order to guarantee
robustness, there is an inherent tradeoff between expressiveness and the need for
global constraints. They showed that if full autonomy was allowed in a system,
autonomous systems could only express rankings based on shortest paths.
Jaggard and Ramachandran [Ref. 18] continued work on class-based path-
vector systems by giving specific global constraints on a system that guarantee ro-
bustness. They proved an exact global condition for the creation of a dispute wheel.
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Furthermore, they gave polynomial-time central and distributed algorithms to enforce
this constraint. Unfortunately, their constraint is not likely to be the most general
constraint for path-vector systems.
Feamster, Johari, and Balakrishnan [Ref. 5] explored the inherent tradeoff
between autonomy and expressiveness. They showed that next-hop rankings were
not safe.
C. THE STABLE PATHS PROBLEM
The Stable Paths Problem (SPP) captures the apparent routing policies over
a network of autonomous systems running BGP [Ref. 12].
The SPP framework is designed to describe the most important features of
path selection in BGP. The SPP framework consists of a simple, bidirectional graph
G, which contains a collection of vertices V and edges E. There is a vertex denoted 0
which represents the origin. Every other vertex is interested in finding a path to the
origin. For each vertex v ∈ V , Pv represents a set of paths that are available from
that vertex v to the origin 0.
The SPP framework also includes Λ , which is a ranking function on the paths
Pv available at each vertex v ∈ V − {0}. Let P be the set of all paths available at
all vertices. Because the set of routes Pu available at each vertex u may be limited,
SPP captures the ability of each AS to filter routes. However, the SPP framework
does not specify whether a route has been filtered by an import filter or an export
filter. For each node v, there is a ranking function λv, that is defined over Pv. Let
Λ = {λv|v ∈ V −{0}}. For each such node v , if P1, P2 ∈ P
v and λv(P1) > λ
v(P2) then
node u is said to prefer the path P1 over the path P2. The ranking function Λ captures
the ability of each AS to autonomously and expressively rank routes. Formally, an
instance of the stable paths problem denoted S is expressed as a triple S = (G,P
,Λ).
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Finally, we make several assumptions about the paths permitted at every node
and the ranking function. We assume that P0 = {(0)}. For all u ∈ V −{0} we assume:
1. If a path is permitted P ∈ Pu, then P is a simple path. (simplicity, no repeated
nodes)
2. ǫ ∈ Pu (empty path permitted)
3. Λu(ǫ) = 0 and ∀P ∈ Pu such that P 6= ǫ, Λu(P ) > 0(empty path lowest
ranked)
4. If P1 , P2 ∈ P
u, P1 6= P2 , and λ
u(P1) = λ
u(P2), then ∃w ∈ V such that
P1 = (uw)P
l






2 are subpaths of P1 and P2
respectively. (strictness, two identically ranked paths have the same next hop)
Rule 1 captures the fact that BGP eliminates paths with repeated AS numbers.
Rule 2 captures the fact that it is possible for every AS to not be able to reach any
arbitrary destination. Rule 3 captures the fact that an AS will take any allowed and
available path to a destination rather than leave the destination unreachable. Rule 4
captures the fact that when an AS receives routes from two different ASes, one route
must be preferred over another.
Figure 5 gives a pictorial representation of the SPP. In this figure we see that
the vertices V consist of {0, 1, 2, 3} and the edges E consist of {(10)(12)(13)(20)(23)(30)}.
At vertex 1, the paths to the origin (10) and (120) are available. Vertex 1 would prefer
to reach the origin through vertex 2 by using path (120) rather than reach the origin
directly using path (10).
A path assignment π is a function that maps each node u ∈ V to a path
π(u) ∈ Pu. The set of paths, choices(π, u), is defined to be
choices(π, u) =
{
{(uv)π(v)|{u, v} ∈ E} ∩ Pu u 6= 0
{(0)} u = 0
Note that, only the path of length 1, (0), is allowed at the origin.
Suppose Ru ⊂ Pu such that each path has a distinct next-hop. The best path
in Ru is defined to be
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Figure 5. A Pictorial Representation of SPP
best(Ru) =
{
P ∈ Ru with maximal λu(P ) Ru 6= ∅
ǫ Ru = ∅
The path assignment π is stable at node n if π(u) = best(choices(π, u)). The
path assignment π is stable if it is stable at each node u ∈ V . As mentioned in [Ref.
12] any stable path assignment also describes a tree containing the origin.
An instance of SPP is solvable if there exists a stable path assignment for the
instance. An instance of SPP is uniquely solvable if there exists exactly one stable
path assignment of the instance.
Deriving subinstances of SPP will be used in later sections represent an in-
stance of the stable paths problem where nodes or links have failed. Given an instance
of SPP S = (G,P,Λ), where G = (V,E), there is a natural way to derive subinstances
of SPP from subsets of E. Suppose E ′ ⊂ E, we define SPP(E ′) = (GE′,PE′,ΛE′) to
be the derived instance of SPP from E ′. Let the graph be GE′ = (V,E
′) . Let the
set of available paths PE′ = {P |P ∈ P} and every edge in the path P is present in
E ′ . For each node u, we will denote its set of available paths as PuE′ . Finally, let the
ranking function be ΛE′ = Λ, but modified to exclude all omitted paths.
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D. MODELS OF BGP BEHAVIOR
There are three models of BGP behavior, the simple path vector protocol, the
single node activation sequences model, and the multiple node activation sequences
model. All three models can be expressed in terms of the stable paths problem
and can express how BGP speakers exchange UPDATE messages and update their
routing tables. Furthermore, all models have specific definitions for safety, which are
all conceptually equivalent to BGP safety. In Chapter IV, we will investigate the
equivalence of the models.
1. Simple Path Vector Protocol
The simple path vector protocol (SPVP) captures the most important behav-
ioral characteristics of BGP [Ref. 13] [Ref. 16] . It is a distributed algorithm which
tries to solve the stable paths problem. The protocol will always diverge if an instance
of SPP is not solvable. However, as we will see later, the protocol can also diverge
for an instance of the stable paths problem that is solvable.
It will be necessary to reintroduce much of the notation from [Ref. 12]. Each
node u can store information about paths in two different data structures. The
data structure rib(u) stores u’s current path to the origin or π(u). For each node
u and a stable paths problem S, we define the set of nodes peers(u) to be the set
{v|(u v) ∈ E}. For each w ∈ peers(u), the data structure rib-in(u ⇐ w) stores
the most recently received and processed path from w. Because we do not assume
messages are processed immediately, it is possible that rib-in(u⇐ w) might contain a
different, older path than rib(w). Therefore, we define the choices of paths available
for a node running SPVP slightly differently than we do for the stable paths problem
in general. Under SPVP, we define the path choices available at node u to be:
SPVP-choices(u) = {(u w)P ∈ Pu|P = rib-in(u⇐ w)}





receive P from w −→
begin
rib-in(u⇐ w) := P
if rib(u) 6= SPVP-best(u) then
begin
rib(u) := SPVP-best(u)
for each v ∈ peers(u) do
begin





Figure 6. SPVP Process at Node u from [Ref. 12] )
This path is the highest ranked path node u can use given the messages that
have been received and processed from its peers.
Figure 1 shows how SPVP runs for each node u ∈ V . If there is an unprocessed
message from any w ∈ peers(u), the guard receive P from w can be activated to
receive the oldest unprocessed message that w has sent containing path P . If there
are multiple links with unprocessed messages, any link may be selected. When the
guard is activated the message is deleted from the link and processed in one atomic
step according to the code following “→”. The code will store the message in rib-
in(u⇐ w). If the current selected path is no longer the best available path, the code
will change the current selected path to be the best available path by executing rib(u)
:= SPVP-best(u). Finally, it will send this path to all neighbors, v ∈ peers(u).
We use the exact notation as presented in [Ref. 12] to model how the protocol
operates as the system in general. Informally, we describe the network state of the
system as all values of rib(u), rib-in(u ⇐ w), and the state of all communication
links. The current path assignment at each node implicitly defines a path assignment
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for the entire system if π(u) = rib(u).
We model (logical) time t with discrete values 0, 1, 2, .... For each node u
and each w ∈ peers(u), mq(u ⇐ w, t) denotes the state of the communication link
from node w to node u at time t. This is a FIFO message queue, and the notation
mq(u⇐ w, t)[i] refers to the ith element of the queue. In particular, mq(u⇐ w, t)[1]
is the first or oldest unprocessed message in the communication link. For each u,
rib(u, t) denotes the value of rib(u) at time t. For each u, and each w ∈ peers(u),
rib-in(u⇐ w, t) denotes the value of rib-in(u⇐ w) at time t.
The network state at time t, denoted s(t), is comprised of all values rib(u, t),
rib-in(u⇐ w, t) , and mq(u⇐ w, t) .
At each state transition from s(t − 1) to s(t) either (1) the network state
remains unchanged, or (2) some node u processes a message from some w ∈ peers(u).
Note that at each transition, only one node processes a message at a time. We define
σ as a sequence of nodes, where at each time t, a the tth node of the sequence is
activated and processes one message. Let s0 = s(0) be some initial state of path
assignments, rib-in’s and message queues. We describe σ as fair with respect to s0 if
any message sent from a node w to a node u will eventually be processed.
Definition: Safe (SPVP) A stable paths problem is called safe if the pro-
tocol SPVP always converges, for any intial state s0 and any fair sequence σ. If at
time t the network state s(t) is such that all message queues mq(u⇐ v, t) are empty
then we say the system has converged at time t, and write S(σ, s0, t) ↓.
More detail about SPVP may be found in [Ref. 12].
2. Single Node Activation Sequences Model
Several models have been proposed that model BGP behavior that rely on one
or more nodes being activated at a given point of time. When a node is activated, this
abstractly corresponds to the node receiving instantaneous, simultaneous UPDATE
messages from all neighbors and selecting the best available path. Feamster et al.
proposed a BGP model (“Routing protocol dynamics”) based on activating only a
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single node at a time [Ref. 5]. Feamster also included a framework to describe BGP
filtering and ranking. However, the Single Node Activation Sequence Model (SNASM)
will be described in terms of the stable paths problem.
Definition: Infinitely Often For a sequence of elements σ = a1, a2, a3..., an
element b is said to appear infinitely often if the element b is repeated in the sequence
infinitely many times.
Definition: Fair Single Node Activation Sequence A sequence of nodes
ω = u1, u2, u3... is said to be a fair single node activation sequence if each node ui ∈ V
and appears infinitely often in the sequence.
In order to introduce the SNASM, it will be necessary to redefine some func-
tions in order to introduce the concept of discrete time. We define the path assignment
of all nodes at time t as π(t) (a mapping from V to P). We define the path assignment
at a particular node u at time t as π(u, t).
The set of available paths choices(π(t),u,t) from node u at a particular time t
is defined to be
choices(π(t),u,t) =
{
{(uv)π(v, t)|{u, v} ∈ E} ∩ Pu u 6= 0
{(O)} u = 0
Figure 7 presents the SNASM Routing Protocol Dynamics. Time is modeled
discretely. The model begins with an initial path assignment at time 0 which is
π(0). The model uses a fair single node activation sequence to represent the fact that
in BGP, each BGP speaker will always be ready to receive and process UPDATE
messages from its peers. At each time t a node ut is activated. This corresponds
to the node receiving all the current path assignments of neighbors simultaneously
and instantaneously. The node will then pick its highest ranked and available path.
Clearly, the model defines a sequence of path assignments π(0), π(1), π(2), ... for each
time t = 0, 1, 2, ... This model differs from SPVP because it does not take into account
that messages may be in transit, and may be processed in different orders if they are
from different neighbors. However, this model can take into account the fact that
when a node changes path, the path it changes to may no longer actually be available.
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For instance, suppose a node v is being activated and takes the highest ranked path
from a node w of the form (v w z)P . It is possible that z has changed its path since
w was last activated. While w advertises the path as available, it isn’t.
SNASM Routing Protocol Dynamics
At time t− 1, the current path assignment is π(t− 1). Each node u has
currently selected path π(u, t− 1) to the destination 0. At time t:
1. A given node ut is activated
2. Node ut updates its path to be the most preferred and available
path which is best(choices(π(t−1),ut,t−1)). Therefore, π(ut, t) =
best(choices(π(t− 1),ut,t− 1)).
3. All other nodes leave their paths unchanged. Therefore, if v ∈
V − {ut}, then π(v, t) = π(v, t− 1)
Figure 7. The SNASM Routing Protocol Dynamics
We may now define safety in terms of SNASM.
Definition: Safe (SNASM) An instance of the stable paths problem is safe
(SNASM) if for any initial path assignment π(0) and any single node fair activation
sequence u1, u2, ..., there exists a finite T such that π(t) = π(T ) for all t ≥ T . In
Chapter 4 we show that if an instance of SPP is safe (SNASM) this does not imply
that it is safe (SPVP).
3. Multiple Node Activation Sequence Model
Gao and Rexford also proposed a BGP model in which nodes are activated,
and receive the highest ranked path available. However, in their model, multiple
nodes may be activated simulatenously. Gao and Rexford also described rankings
and filterings in terms of their own framework. However, we will write the multiple
node activation sequence model (MNASM) in terms of the stable paths problem.
Definition: Fair Multiple Node Activation Sequence A sequence of
sets of nodes ω = U1, U2, U3... is said to be a fair multiple node activation sequence if
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each node v ∈ V appears infinitely often in the sequence as the element of some set
Uk ⊆ V .
MNASM Routing Protocol Dynamics
At time t− 1, the current path assignment is π(t− 1). Each node u has
currently selected path π(u, t− 1) to the destination 0. At time t:
1. A Set of nodes Ut is activated
2. Each node v ∈ Ut updates its path to be the most preferred and
available path which is best(choices(π(t− 1),v,t− 1)). Therefore,
if v ∈ Ut, then π(v, t) = best(choices(π(t− 1),v,t− 1)).
3. All other nodes V −Ut leave their paths unchanged. Therefore, if
w ∈ V − Ut, then π(w, t) = π(w, t− 1).
Figure 8. The MNASM Routing Protocol Dynamics
Figure 8 presents the Multiple Node Activation Sequence Model. Time is
modeled discretely. The model uses a fair multiple node activation sequence, so each
node is activated infinitely often. The model begins with a path assignment π(0).
At each time t, a set of nodes Ut are activated. This corresponds to each node in
Ut instantaneously and simultaneously receiving the path assignments at time t − 1
from all other nodes. Each node in Ut will then update its current path assignment to
the highest ranked available path. Note that this model differs from SPVP because
it does not allow for messages from different neighbors to arrive and be processed in
different orders. However, it can model the possibility that the routing information
at a given node is not current.
We can now define safety in terms of the multiple node activation sequence
model.
Definition: Safe (MNASM) An instance of the stable paths problem is safe
(MNASM) if for any initial path assignment π(0) and multiple node fair activation
sequence U1, U2, ..., there exists a finite T such that π(t) = π(T ) for all t ≥ T .
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4. Comparison of Models to BGP
For several reasons, the simple path vector protocol most accurately models
BGP behavior. First, RFC 4271 specifies that only one UPDATE message may
be processed at any given time. Second, while MNASM can model multiple nodes
receiving update messages simultaneously, we will show in Chapter IV that SPVP
can match any path assignment reached by MNASM.
However, MNASM is a much simpler model to conduct proofs on because one
does not need to keep track of the state of message queues. In Chapter V, we will
use MNASM for the proof of the main theorem of this paper.
E. ROBUSTNESS
Definition: Robustness An instance of SPP is robust (MODEL) if and only
if that instance and every subinstance is uniquely solvable and safe (MODEL).
For this paper, if no model is specified, we take robust to mean robust (MNASM).
F. DISPUTE WHEELS
The concept of dispute wheels was first introduced by Griffin and Wilfong
[Ref. 12]. A dispute wheel is a sequence of nodes and paths that represent mutually
conflicting policies due to rankings. These mutually conflicting paths may cause an
instance of SPP to be unsolvable or give rise to permanent oscillations, making the
instance not safe.






R ), of size k is a sequence of nodes
−→
U = u0, u1, ...uk−1, and sequences of nonempty paths
−→
Q = Q0, Q1, ...Qk−1 and
−→
R =
R0, R1, ...Rk−1, such that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 the following hold true:
1. Ri is a path from ui to ui+1
2. Qi ∈ P
ui
3. RiQi+1 ∈ P
ui
4. λui(Qi) ≤ λ
ui(RiQi+1)
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Paths of the form Qi are often described as spoke paths. Paths of the form
Ri are often described as rim paths. Rule 1 specifies the form of a rim path. Rule 2
specifies that that that a spoke path must be available from the originating node, thus
assuring that this path can be assigned to the originating node. Rule 3 specifies that
the combined rim path and spoke path must be available from the originating node,
thus assuring that this path can be assigned to the originating node. Rule 4 stipulates
the preference for the combined rim path and spoke path, over a spoke path. Because
every node in the sequence
−→
U has this property, the policies are mutually conflicting.
Figure 9 presents a generalized dispute wheel. The next section presents spe-
cific instances of SPP and examples of their dispute wheels.
Figure 9. A Generalized Dispute Wheel
As discussed above, a dispute wheel represents a set of mutually conflicting
rankings for some nodes. In BGP, this would represent a set of mutually conflicting
policies. Griffin and Wilfong proved several theorems about instances of SPP that do
not contain dispute wheels [Ref. 12]. To summarize, they proved that if an instance
of SPP, S does not contain a dispute wheel, then S is uniquely solvable, safe (SPVP),
and robust.
Theorem V.4 from [Ref. 12] 1. If the stable paths problem S has no dispute
wheel, then S has a unique solution.
Theorem V.9 from [Ref. 12] 1. If S has no dispute wheel, then S is safe
(SPVP).
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Theorem V.10 from [Ref. 12] 1. Let S be an instance of the stable paths
problem. If S has no dispute wheel, then S is robust (SPVP).
Once Griffin and Wilfong have presented dispute wheels, they describe one
set of constraints that can prevent dispute wheels. They show that any instance of
SPP that uses route filtering alone, and ranks paths based only on hop count can not
contain a dispute wheel. If these constraints are followed for the stable paths problem
S, then S is guaranteed to be robust.
G. INTERESTING INSTANCES OF SPP
1. Solvable, but not Safe (SNASM or MNASM or
SPVP)
In Figure 10, we present an instance of SPP that is solvable, but not safe
(SPVP or MNASM). We call this instance “NEXT.” NEXT has three solutions. In
one solution, π = (1 0)(2 3 1 0)(3 1 0). In the second solution, π = (1 2 0)(2 0)(3 1 2 0).
In the third solution, π = (1 2 3 0)(2 3 0)(3 0).
Figure 10. SPP Instance NEXT
Despite having three solutions, there is an initial path assignment and fair
multiple node activation sequence that is not safe (SNASM or MNASM). Consider
the initial path assignment π(0) = (1 0)(2 0)(3 1 0). Table I gives an unsafe fair
activation sequence for NEXT. This activation sequence could consist of either single
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nodes or singleton sets, so both activation models, SNASM and MNASM apply to it.
We can see that this sequence of path assignments could repeat indefinitely under a
fair activation sequence because the path assignment at time 0 is the same at time
6, and all nodes are activated at least once in between. We claim that NEXT is also
not safe (SPVP). In Chapter IV we prove why this is true.
time i π(i)
0 (1 0) (2 0) (3 1 0)
1 (1 2 0) (2 0) (3 1 0)
2 (1 2 0) (2 3 1 0)(3 1 0)
3 ((1 2 0) (2 3 1 0) (3 1 2 0)
4 (1 0) (2 3 1 0) (3 1 2 0)
5 (1 0) (2 0)(3 1 2 0)
6 (1 0) (2 0) (3 1 0)
Table I. Path Assignments of NEXT. If a path assignment is underlined, that node
has been activated at that time.
2. Uniquely Solvable, but Not Safe (MNASM)
In Figure 11, we present an instance of SPP that is uniquely solvable, but not
safe (MNASM). The instance has the unique solution π = (1 3 0)(2 0)(3 0)(4 3 0).
Figure 11. An Instance of SPP that is Uniquely Solvable, but Not Safe (Naughty
Gadget from [Ref. 12] )
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Despite this unique solution, the instance is not safe. Consider the initial path
assignment π = (1 0)(2 0)(3 4 2 0)(4 2 0). Table II gives an unsafe sequence of path
assignments that may be repeated indefinitely.
step π
0 (1 0) (2 0) (3 4 2 0) (4 2 0)
1 (1 0) (2 1 0) (3 4 2 0) (4 2 0)
2 (1 0) (2 1 0) (3 4 2 0) ǫ
3 (1 0) (2 1 0) (3 0) ǫ
4 (1 0) (2 1 0) (3 0) (4 3 0)
5 (1 3 0) (2 1 0) (3 0) (4 3 0)
6 (1 3 0) (2 0) (3 0) (4 3 0)
7 (1 3 0) (2 0) (3 0) (4 2 0)
8 (1 3 0) (2 0) (3 4 2 0) (4 2 0)
9 (1 0) (2 0) (3 4 2 0) (4 2 0)
Table II. An Unsafe Sequence of Path Assignments for NAUGHTY GADGET from
[Ref. 12]. If a path assignment is underlined, that node has been activated at that
time.
3. Categories
In previous sections, we defined some possible properties of instances of SPP
such as robustness, unique solvability, and safety. We would like to categorize these
properties in relation to one another. Figure 12 shows how properties of an SPP
instance relate to one another, over the space of all SPP instances. In this diagram,
we assume all definitions of safety and robustness correspond to the same model. In
Chapter IV, we will discuss in more detail how these definitions are related. Note
that the absence of a dispute wheel is not a sufficient and necessary condition for
robustness. In Chapter V, we will introduce an instance of SPP that is robust, but
has a dispute wheel. Also note that safety, implies solvability, because for an instance
of SPP to be safe there must exist a solution.
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Figure 12. Properties of SPP Instances over the Space of All SPP Instances
H. HIERARCHICAL BGP
Gao and Rexford [Ref. 8] introduced conditions on filtering, ranking, and
topology that guarantee the convergence of BGP. They noted that every eBGP ses-
sion should define an interorganizational relationship between the two connected
ASes. They limited the possible relationships to only peer-to-peer relationships and
customer-provider relationships. Therefore, given an AS, u, a neighbor w must be-
long to the set of providers, provider(u); the set of customers customer(u); or the
set of peers, peer(u). Note that Gao’s definition of peer(u) is much different than
Griffin’s definition of peers(u). In Gao’s definition, a neighbor w ∈ peer(u) will follow
strict guidelines that will be discussed below. In Griffin’s definition peers(u) is all the





Gao and Rexford introduce one topological constraint. There can be no cycle
of provider-customer relationships. More precisely let the provider-to-customer graph
be a subgraph generated where the only edges are directed from provider to customer.
This resulting subgraph should be acyclic (or a DAG).
Gao and Rexford introduce a number of filtering policies that reflect the real
world configuration of ASes. These policies reflect the idea than an ISP should not
advertise routes for traffic without financial benefit. These rules are summarized as
the following policies:
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• Exporting to a customer: In exchanging routing information with a cus-
tomer, an AS can export its routes, as well as routes learned from its providers
and peers.
• Exporting to a provider or peer: In exchanging routing information with
a provider or peer, an AS can export its routes and the routes of its customers,
but it can not export routes learned from other providers or peers.
Gao and Rexford also introduce a number of guidelines on the ranking function
of individual ASes. A system of ASes is said to meet Guideline A [Ref. 8] if every AS
prefers a route via a customer over a route via a provider or peer. Formally, let S be
an instance of SPP. For all u ∈ V , for all P1, P2 ∈ P
u where P1 = (ux...0) and P2 =
(uy...0), if x ∈ customer(u) and y ∈ provider(u)
⋃
peer(u) then λu(P1) > λ
u(P2).
Gao and Rexford proved that a system of ASes which follows Guideline A has
a stable state and is safe under the Multiple Node Activation Sequence Model. We
use a different proof to show that any system of ASes which follows Guideline A can
not contain a dispute wheel and is robust.
Theorem III.1. If an instance of SPP meets the exporting policies, the topo-
logical constraint and Guideline A from [Ref. 8], then the instance of SPP can’t
contain a dispute wheel and is robust.
Proof. We use proof by contradiction. Suppose an instance of SPP meets the
exporting policies, the topological constraint, and Guideline A [Ref. 8] and has a






R ) have size k. For each Qj ∈
−→
Q
of length m, let Qj be the path Qj = (qj,0qj,1qj,2...qj,m), where qj,0 = uj and qj,m = 0.
For each Rj ∈
−→
R of length n, let Rj be the path Rj = (rj,0rj,1rj,2...rj,n), where
rj,0 = uj and rj,n = uj+1. Due to the export filters on each AS (or node), for all paths
Qj of size m, we must have qj,i−1 ∈ customer(qj,i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If this was
not the case, then the path Rj−1Qj would not be available to uj−1, Rj−1Qj 6∈ P
uj−1
due to export filters. Therefore, because qj,0 ∈ customer(qj,1), we must also have
rj,0 ∈ customer(rj,1), otherwise the route Rj−1Qj would not be preferred to Qj−1 due
to the fact that its first hop would be a provider or a peer. Also due to the export
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filters at each node, for all paths Rj of size n, we must have rj,i−1 ∈ customer(rj,i)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If this was not the case then the path RjQj+1 would not be
available to node uj. We have now formed a cycle of customer-provider relationships
along the path (R0R1...Rk). However, this contradicts the topological constraint that
the provider-to-customer graph is acyclic. Therefore, we have a contradiction. We
have shown by contradiction that an instance of SPP can never meet the exporting
policies, the topological constraint, and Guideline A [Ref. 8] and have a dispute
wheel. Therefore, If an instance of SPP meets the exporting policies, the topological
constraint and Guideline A [Ref. 8], then the instance of SPP can’t contain a dispute
wheel. The instance of SPP must also be robust, because it contains no dispute
wheels.
Gao and Rexford developed this model further to allow for a back-up relation-
ship between neighboring ASes.
I. CLASS-BASED PATH-VECTOR SYSTEMS
Griffin, Jaggard, and Ramachandran introduced a much more general form
of Gao and Rexford’s model, called the class-based path-vector system [Ref. 11].
Jaggard and Ramachandran presented a generalized framework that can be used to
describe any BGP system where the filtering (also called scoping) rules and ranking
rules are based upon the relationships between classes of ASes.
Informally, a path-vector system describes some of the low level characteristics
of a path-vector protocol. A path-vector system describes the possible destinations,
paths to destinations which may be exchanged, rankings for available paths, some
basic local import/ export constraints, and some basic import / export transformation
rules. Rankings for available paths may be specified similar to the way RFC 4271
ranks paths in BGP, or by use of other metrics such as shortest hop count alone.
Basic local constraints make sure that paths known at a given node satisfy certain
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properties. For instance, paths should only be imported if the destination is a possible
routing destination. Basic / import export rules may be configured to exclude paths
which contain loops or perform other, less mundane actions. A path-vector system
can be used to describe most characteristics of BGP. However, a path-vector system
does not describe exactly how messages are exchanged between nodes.
Griffin, Jaggard, and Ramachandran also define a policy language to capture
high level characteristics of a system. For BGP, a policy language may describe
whether a path is given a specified LOCAL PREF attribute when the path is imported
from specified neighbors. Together, a path-vector system and policy language may
be used to describe the stable paths problem.
The class-based path-vector systems are a set of policy languages which meet
some general constraints. These constraints are formed using matrices. First, every
class-based path-vector system has a set of classes, such as “customer” or “provider”.
The cross-class matrix describes which relationships may occur and row/column
numbers correspond to specific classes. Each row and column in this matrix has
exactly one “1” and all other entries are “0.” This matrix may describe facts such
as “customer-provider relationships are allowed” or “customer-peer relationships are
not allowed.” The preference matrix describes some ranking rules for different classes,
such as “prefer all paths received from customers to all paths received from providers.”
The level matrix describes the scoping rules such as “export all routes learned from
a customer to a provider.” These preference matrix and level matrix can also be used
to describe hierarchical properties of BGP. For instance, depending on whether a
relationship is with a tier 1 or tier 2 peer different exporting rules may be specified.
Jaggard and Ramachandran continued work on class-based path-vector sys-
tems by giving a much more general form of Theorem III.1. In their paper they give
an exact condition for dispute wheel creation based upon the particular relationships,
scoping rules, and ranking rules of a particular system, as well as global constraints
[Ref. 18]. This exact condition is still stricter than a necessary and sufficient condi-
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tion to guarantee BGP robustness, because as we have seen, some instances of SPP
(and systems of ASes) may have dispute wheels and still be robust.
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IV. COMPARISON OF BGP MODELS
In the previous chapter we introduced three different models of BGP behavior;
the simple path vector protocol (SPVP), the single node activation sequence model
(SNASM), and the multiple node activation sequence model (MNASM). Because all
models are expressed in terms of the stable paths problem, solvability and unique
solvability is equivalent between the three different models. However, in this chapter
we investigate two other issues. First, we investigate whether any sequence of path
assignments given by one model can match another model. Second, we investigate
whether safety in one model implies safety in another model.
A. MATCHING PATH ASSIGNMENTS
We investigate whether any sequence of path assignments given by one model
can be matched by another model. Informally, we describe matching as the ability
of one model to begin with the same path assignment as another model, and reach
all possible subsequent path assignments for the other model. We allow intermediate
path assignments to be taken between equal path assignments. We say that the
sequence of path assignments ω = π1(0), π1(1), π1(2), ... matches the sequence of path
assignments σ = π2(0), π2(1), π2(2), ... if there exists a subsequence of ω that is equal
to σ.
Figure 13. An Instance of SPP That Shows MNASM Does Not Match SPVP
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Definition: Matching of ModelsWe say that BGP model A matches BGP
model B, if for any sequence of path assignments given by model B denoted by σ,
there exists a sequence of path assignments given by BGP model A that matches σ.
We proceed to our negative results first.
Theorem IV.1 (MNASM does not match SPVP). The multiple node activa-
tion sequence model does not match the simple path vector protocol
Proof. Consider the following counterexample presented in Figure 13. Let
ω = πω(0), πω(1), πω(2), ... be the sequence of path assignments given by SPVP that
we will show can not be matched by the multiple node activation sequence model. As
usual, the path assignment at node u at time t is denoted by πω(u, t). We induce the
initial state as follows, let πω(3, 0) = (3 0) and let nodes 1 and 2 have the empty path
assignment. For each u ∈ V and w ∈ peers(u), let mq(u⇐ w) be a message informing
u of π(w, 0). As depicted in Figure 14, there is a sequence of path assignments in
SPVP that gives a final, stable path assignment πω = (1 0)(2 1 0)(3 2 1 0). This is
achieved by processing messages in the following order. At t = 1, node 1 processes
mq(1 ⇐ 0)[1] and changes its path such that π(1, 1) = (1 0). At t = 2, node 2
processes mq(2 ⇐ 1)[1] and keeps the empty path assignment. At t = 3, node 2
processes mq(2 ⇐ 1)[1] = (1 0) and changes its path assignment to π(2, 3) = (2 1
0). At t = 4, 5, 6, 7, node 3 processes mq(3 ⇐ 1)[1],mq(3 ⇐ 1)[2],mq(3 ⇐ 0)[1],and
mq(3 ⇐ 2)[1] and does not change its path assignment. At t = 8, node 3 processes
mq(3⇐ 2)[1] = (2 1 0) and changes its path assignment to π(3, 8) = (3 2 1 0).
However, for this same initial path assignment, the multiple node activation
sequence model can not reach these subsequent path assignments. This is because
when any node is activated, it receives the highest ranked paths. Therefore, only
node 1 can change path assignments and will change its path to (1 3 0). This is a
stable path assignment, and no future changes can occur.
Therefore, there exists a sequence of path assignments given by SPVP that
can’t be matched by any sequence of path assignments given by MNASM
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Figure 14. A Sequence of Path Assignments Given by SPVP for Figure 13
We have shown that the multiple node activation sequence model does not
match the simple path vector protocol.
However, we would like to know whether SPVP matches the multiple node
path vector protocol.
Theorem IV.2 (SPVP matches MNASM). The simple path vector protocol
matches the multiple node activation model.
Proof. Let S be an instance of the stable paths problem. Let ω = U1, U2, ...
be any fair multiple node activation sequence and let σ = πω(0), πω(1), πω(2) be the
sequence of path assignments for ω given by the MNASM. We would like to show
that there exists a sequence of path assignments given by SPVP that matches ω. Let
θ = πSPV P (0), πSPV P (1), πSPV P (2), ... be the subsequence of path assignments given
by SPVP we are trying to form. We would like to show that there exists an initial
state for SPVP and ordering of message receipts such that πSPV P (i) = πω(i) for all
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i ≥ 0. Let the initial state be induced by πω(0) such that πω(0) = πSPV P (0), each
rib-in(u⇐ w) = ǫ, and each message queue mq(u⇐ w) = πω(w, 0).
Let X(i) be the induction predicate that after the ith element of the subse-
quence θ has been formed, πω(i) = πSPV P (i) and for all nodes u ∈ V , if best(choices(π(i),u,i))
has a next hop of w and πSPV P (u, i) 6= best(choices(π(i),u,i)) either there is message
in the queue mq(u ⇐ w) that informs u of the path best(choices(π(i),u,i)) OR rib-
in(u⇐ w) has this path stored already.
Base Case. The predicate X(0) holds true because our initial state has those
properties.
Induction Step. Suppose X(i) is true. Under MNASM, a set of nodes Ui+1
will be activated at time i+1. For each u ∈ Ui+1, we will never process messages that
have been generated since the path assignment πSPV P (i) was reached, because this
may cause a node to take a path assignment other than the one we would like to be
taken at πω(i). However, we process all other messages in all queues, in any arbitrary
order. This will give u an exact picture of what neighboring path assignments were
under πSPV P (i), and guarantees that the best(choices(π(i + 1),v,i + 1)) will be the
final path selected. Once this has been completed for each node u ∈ Ui+1, we have
created a path assignment πSPV P (i + 1) = πω(i + 1) Now, suppose any other node
v is no longer assigned the path best(choices(π(i + 1),v,i + 1)) and this path’s first
next hop is w. Suppose the node v 6∈ Ui . It must still either have a message in
the queue mq(v ⇐ w) informing v of that path or rib-in(v ⇐ w) has this path.
Suppose the node v was activated in the set Ui. There are two possible cases, or a
combination of both. In the first case, a neighboring node x ∈ Ui was activated and
changed its path assignment so now, v has an even higher ranked path available in
choices(π(i+1),v,i+1) that was not available in choices(π(i),v,i). However this path
should have been advertised, so there must be a message in the queue mq(u ⇐ x)
informing v of this path. Otherwise, suppose the path πSPV P (v, i + 1) has been
withdrawn. The new path best(choices(π(i+1),v,i+ 1)) must either be contained in
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a rib− in or have been advertised by the withdrawal. Therefore X(i)⇒ X(i+ 1)
By the principle of induction, we’ve shown that the path assignments generated
under MNASM can be generated by taking a subsequence of path assignments under
SPVP.
Finally, we must check that the processing of messages is fair ; every message
will eventually be processed. The processing of messages is fair, because every node
is activated infinitely often under MNASM, and each time a node is activated, all old
messages will processeded before the last patest assignment was generated.
Corollary IV.3 (SPVP matches SNASM). By a similar argument, the simple
path vector protocol matches the single node activation sequence model.
Theorem IV.4 (MNASM matches SNASM). The multiple node activation
sequence model matches the single node activation sequence model
Proof. Let ω = u0, u1, u2, ... be any fair single node activation sequence. We
form a fair multiple node activation sequence ωl by simply taking one element subsets
such that ωl = {u0}, {u1}, {u2}, ... . The path assignment for ω will exactly equal the
path assignment for ωl, because nodes are activated identically under both models,
and the same node is activate at each time.
Figure 15 depicts the result of this section. We consider the space of instances
of SPP and initial path assignments. The intersection of two models describes an
instance of SPP and initial path path assignments for both models that match each
other for any possible sequence of path assignments. Likewise, the places where model
A does not intersect with model B describes an instance of SPP and initial path
assignment that results in a sequence of path assignments that can not be matched
by model A.
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Figure 15. How Models Match Each Other over the Space of Instances of SPP and
Initial Path Assignments
B. COMPARISON OF SAFETY
In the preceeding section, we investigated whether different models of BGP
match each other. We can use these results to show that safety as defined in one
model can imply safety in another model.
Theorem IV.5. Let S be an instance of the stable paths problem. If S is not
safe (MNASM), then S is not safe (SPVP).
Proof. Suppose S is not safe (MNASM). Then there exists at least one fair
multiple node activation sequence, such that there is not finite time T where the
π(T ) = π(t) for all t ≥ T . By Theorem IV.2, there is an ordering of message
processing such that SPVP will have a subsequence of path assignments with the
exact same path assignments. Therefore, the message queues can never empty and S
is not safe (SPVP)
Corollary IV.6 (Safe (SPVP) ⇒ Safe (MNASM)). By the contrapositive
of Theorem IV.5, If S is an instance of SPP that is safe (SPVP), then S is safe
(MNASM)
Theorem IV.7. Let S be an instance of the stable paths problem. If S is not
safe (SNASM), then S is not safe (MNASM)
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Proof. Suppose S is not safe (SNASM). Then there exists some fair single
node activation sequence such that there is no finite time T where where the π(T ) =
π(t) for all t ≥ T . By Theorem IV.4, we can form a fair multiple node activation
sequence from this sequence which also has the property where there is no finite time
T where where the π(T ) = π(t) for all t ≥ T . By definition, S is not safe (MNASM).
Corollary IV.8 (Safe (MNASM) ⇒ Safe (SNASM)). By the contrapositive
of Theorem IV.7, If S is an instance of SPP that is safe (MNASM), then S is safe
(SNASM)
The following corollary is derived from applying Corollaries IV.6 and IV.8.
Corollary IV.9. If S is an instance of SPP that is safe (SPVP), then it is
safe (SNASM).
Theorem IV.10 (Safe (SNASM) 6⇒ Safe (MNASM)). Let S be an instance
of SPP. If S is Safe (MNASM), then this does not imply that S is safe (SNASM).
Proof. Consider the the following counterexample, which is presented in Fig-
ure 16. This instance of SPP is not safe (MNASM). Let S have the initial path
assignment π(1, 0) = (10) and π(2, 0) = (20). This routing system will not converge
under the fair multiple node activation sequence, {12}, {12}, {12}, .... However, S
is safe (SNASM). Given any fair single node activation sequence and initial path
assignment, it will always converge.
Figure 17 depicts the result of this section. We consider the space to be the set
of all instances of the stable paths problem. We are not sure whether Safe (MNASM)
⇒ Safe (SPVP) or not. It is possible that these two areas are exactly equal.
In this section we have shown that models of BGP do not necessary have
equivalent definitions of safety, and that some path assignments of some models can
not necessarily be matched by other models. These results have important conse-
quences. For instance, a theorem proved about robustness using one model, may not
necessarily imply robustness for other models.
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Figure 16. Instance of SPP for Theorem IV.10. DISAGREE from [Ref. 12]
Figure 17. Safety Between Different Models
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V. A WEAKER SUFFICIENT CONDITION
FOR ROBUSTNESS
A. MOTIVATION
There have been several proposals to guarantee the robustness of BGP. In
this paper, we pursue an approach that relies on operational guidelines and global
constraints. Griffin et al showed that if an instance of SPP does not have a dispute
wheel, the instance must be robust. Unfortunately, this condition is too strict; there
exist instances of SPP which contain dispute wheels but are robust. Consider the
instance of SPP in Figure 18. This instance of SPP is robust, but contains the
dispute wheel in Figure 19. In this section, we give a weaker sufficient condition for
robustness. Our approach focuses on determining whether the subinstance of SPP
generated for each dispute wheel 1) is robust and 2) has the property such that for
each node of the dispute wheel, all possible paths are contained in the dispute wheel.
Figure 18. An Instance of SPP that has a Dispute Wheel, but is Robust
Once we give a weaker sufficient condition for robustness, we investigate how
to determine whether instances of SPP are robust, despite the presence of one or
more dispute wheels. We focus on developing new global and local constraints that
guarantee robustness, despite the presence of a dispute wheel.
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Figure 19. The Dispute Wheel of Figure 18
B. SUBINSTANCES OF SPP FROM DISPUTE WHEELS
Given an instance of SPP S = (G,P,Λ), there is a natural way to derive







R ), we define SPP(Π) = (GΠ,PΠ,ΛΠ) to be the derived instance of SPP
from Π. Let the graph GΠ = (VΠ, EΠ) have the property where VΠ contains every




R and EΠ contains every edge (u v) ∈ E such that
u, v ∈ VΠ . Let the set of available paths PΠ = {P |P ∈ P} and every edge in the
path P is present in EΠ . For each node u, we will denote its set of available paths as
PuΠ. Finally, let the ranking function be ΛΠ = Λ, but modified to exclude all omitted
paths.
We define a dispute wheel Π to be robust if SPP(Π) is robust.
C. ALL DISPUTEWHEELS ROBUST IMPLIES UNIQUELY
SOLVABLE
To prove than an instance of SPP is robust, we need to show that the instance
(and every subinstance) of SPP is uniquely solvable.
Theorem V.1. If every dispute wheel of a stable paths problem is robust (or
even just uniquely solvable), then the stable paths problem is uniquely solvable.
This proof closely follows the proof of Theorem V.4 [Ref. 12].
50
Proof. We use proof by contradiction. Let S be an instance of the stable
paths problem. Suppose that every dispute wheel of S is robust, and it has at least
two distinct solutions π1 = (P1, ..., Pn−1) and π2 = (Q1, ...Qn−1). As discussed above,
every solution defines a tree rooted at the origin. Let T1 and T2 be trees, rooted at
the origin the origin, that are defined by π1 and π2 respectively. Given a graph or
component G let V (G) and E(G) be the vertices and edges of the graph or compo-
nent respectively. Let H be the graph (V,E(T1) ∩ E(T2)). Let T be the connected
component of H containing the origin. Note that T must be a tree because it is a
intersection of two trees. Every edge of E(T1∪T2) not contained in E(T ) = (T1∩T2)
is either in E(T1−T2) or E(T2−T1). We say an edge (uv) is entering a set of vertices
V if exactly one of the nodes {u, v} is in the set of vertices V . Therefore, every edge
of T1 ∪ T2 entering V (T ) must either be in E(T1 − T2) or E(T2 − T1).
Figure 20. Illustration for Theorem V.1. The nodes inside the dashed circle all
represent nodes belonging to T . Outside the circle are edges and nodes in T1 and T2.
Dashed Edges are in T2. Solid edges are in T1
We now construct a dispute wheel. Figure 20 visually presents the dispute
wheel that will be formed. Note that because the two solutions are unique, T1 6= T2,
the set of vertices V −V (T ) must be nonempty and at least one of the trees has an edge
entering V (T ). Without loss of generality, consider any two nodes u , v in T1 such that
v ∈ T and u 6∈ T . The node u can not have the empty path assignment in π2 because
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it can not prefer the empty path to the available path (uv)Pv. Therefore, the node u
must also belong to T2. We will begin to construct the dispute wheel by choosing an
edge {u0, v0} ∈ T1 such that u0 6∈ V (T ) and v0 ∈ V (T ). As discussed above u0 does
have a path to the origin through T2 which must be of the form R0(u1v1)Qv1 that
has the following properties: (i) u1 6∈ V (T ) and v1 ∈ V (T ) (ii) The path R0 is a path
from u0 to u1 in T2 and contained entirely in the node set V − V (T ) (iii) Finally, R0
must have a length of at least one, otherwise one of the paths π1(u0) or π2(u0) would
be unstable. This process is repeated at node u1 except now we already have a path
directly to the origin for T2 and we are looking for a path to the origin through T1.
We continue alternating and searching for paths in this fashion until we eventually
repeat some node, which without loss of generality is u0. We must eventually repeat a
node because the set of nodes in V −V (T ) is finite and during our search we continue
to reach a new node each time unless a node has been repeated.
We must now show that we have created a dispute wheel. Due to our con-
struction, we have already shown all the properties of a dispute wheel except that for
each i, λui((uivi)Qi) ≤ λ
ui(Ri(ui+1vi+1)Qi+1). To show this, we assume without loss
of generality that the path (uivi)Qi is contained in T1 . Suppose the inequality did
not hold. Then we would have λui((uivi)Qi) > λ
ui(Ri(ui+1vi+1)Qi+1) which would
mean that T2 should have preferred the same path to T and that T2 is not stable.
But, this contradicts our assumption, so the inequality must hold and we must have
created a dispute wheel that has at least two distinct solutions.
However, the dispute wheel must have a unique solution, because every dispute
wheel of S is robust. Therefore, we have a contradiction. We have used indirect proof
to show that if every dispute wheel of an instance S of SPP is robust, then the instance
of SPP is uniquely solvable.
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D. ALL DISPUTE WHEELS ROBUST AND COMPLETE
IMPLIES SAFETY
To prove an instance of SPP is robust, we must also show that the instance
(and every subinstance) is safe.
Griffin et al. gave a procedure to construct a dispute wheel given an unsafe
instance of SPP. We will use a similar method to construct a dispute wheel that is
not safe. They used the procedure to prove the following theorem. [Ref. 12]:
Theorem V.9 from [Ref. 12] 2. If S has no dispute wheel, then S is safe
(SPVP).
1. Selecting an Appropriate Model
In the previous chapter, we compared the various BGP Models. For the fol-
lowing proofs, we will use the multiple node activation sequence model. We believe
that these results could be proved differently to provide similar results for the simple
path vector protocol. However, for the remainder of the chapter, when we describe
a stable paths problem to be “safe,” we specifically mean that it is safe (MNASM).
Likewise, when we describe a stable paths problem to be “unsafe,” we mean that it
is not safe (MNASM).
2. Complete Dispute Wheels
We introduce the concept of a complete dispute wheel. We will show that if
every dispute wheel of an instance of SPP is complete and robust, then the instance
is robust. Much of the following notation is taken from [Ref. 12].
Suppose S is an instance of the stable paths problem that is not safe (MNASM).
For some initial path assignment π(0) and activation sequence σ, there does not ex-
ist any finite time T such that the path assignment does not change after time T .
However, there exist some nodes that do not change their paths infinitely often. We
define the set of nodes C to be the nodes that do not change their path assignment
after time Tc. We define the set O to be the set of nodes that change their paths
infinitely often. For each node u ∈ V we define values(σ,π(0),u) to be the set of paths
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that u adopts infinitely often. Note that for u ∈ C, values(σ,π(0),u) will be a one
element set, equal to {π(tc, u)}.
Suppose P is a path of the form (w0w1...wk). We define P [wiwj] as the sub-
path (wiwi+1...wj). Also, we define P [1] to be the first node w0.
Let S be an unsafe instance of SPP. Let U be the set of all nodes such that
u ∈ O and u adopts a path (uw)Q ∈ values(σ,π(0),u) such that w ∈ C. For any node
u ∈ U , let Q-path(u) be the lowest ranked path of values(σ,π(0),u) that goes directly
to C. Finally, we define RQ-paths(u) to be the set of paths values(σ,π(0),u) − {Q-
path(u)}. By Lemma V.6, if P ∈ RQ-paths(u), we can write this path as P = R
Q-path(v) where R is a path of the form (u w1 w2...v) where v ∈ U,wi 6∈ U and
Q-path(v) is a path that leads directly to some fixed node w ∈ C. We denote the
set of all paths of the form (u w1 w2...v) as R-paths(u). Note that for each path
of RQ-paths(u), there is a corresponding subpath in R-paths(u). Finally, for such
a path P , we define entering(P ) as the node v that enters C by routing through w.
Some of this terminology is presented in Figure 21.
Figure 21. An Illustration of Some Terminology
Definition: Complete Dispute Wheel Let S be an instance of SPP. We
define a dispute wheel of to be complete and denote it Θ(S) if for all u ∈ Θ(S), we
have PuSPP(Θ(S))= P
u
S. (for each node in the dispute wheel, all available paths for the
instance S are contained inside the dispute wheel)
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3. Existence of Dispute Wheel for an Unsafe Instance
of SPP
The following lemmas will be needed to show that every unsafe instance of
SPP contains a dispute wheel.
Lemma V.2. If every node of a digraph G has an outgoing degree of exactly
one, the graph must contain a cycle.
Proof. We will show that this is true by induction on the number of nodes of
the graph, which will be denoted by i. There are also exactly i edges. Let W (i) be
the induction hypothesis that every graph with i nodes contains a cycle if the graph
has i edges.
Base Case. Let i = 1. This one element graph contains a cycle, because any
outgoing edge from the single node must be to itself. Therefore W (1) is true.
Induction Step. Suppose every graph with i nodes and edges contains a cycle.
Let G be some arbitrary graph with i + 1 nodes and i + 1 edges. Let u be some
arbitrary edge. If u has an outgoing edge to itself, then G must contain a cycle and
W (i+ 1) is true. Otherwise suppose, u has an outgoing edge to some node v.
In our first case, suppose u has no incoming edges. If we remove u and the
outgoing edge (u v), we will be left with a graph with exactly i nodes and edges. This
graph must have a cycle, so G must have a cycle and W (i+ 1) must be true.
In our second case, suppose u has one or more incoming edges from nodes
x, y, z.... For each such edge (x u), (y u), (z u)..., we replace the edge with (x v), (y v), (z v)....
Finally, we remove node u and the edge (u v). We are left with a graph with i nodes
and i edges. This graph must contain a cycle. This implies that G must have also
contained a cycle. We have examined all cases and W (i)⇒W (i+ 1).
By the principle of induction, if every node of a digraph G has an outgoing
degree of exactly one, the graph must contain a cycle.
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Now, suppose instead of having an outgoing degree of exactly one, a graph has
an outgoing degree of one or more. The graph must still contain a cycle, because we
are introducing additional edges.
A strongly connected component is a maximal subgraph of a digraph such that
each element of the subgraph can reach every other element of the subgraph.
Lemma V.3. Let G = (V,E) be a digraph. G has at least one strongly
connected component with no outgoing edges to other strongly connected components.
Proof. We use proof by contradiction. Suppose every strongly connected com-
ponent had at least one outgoing edge to another strongly connected component and
there are n strongly connected components. Every digraph may be decomposed com-
pletely into strongly connected components, creating another digraph of strongly
connected components [Ref. 3] . If every connected component has at least one
outgoing edge to another strongly connected component, there must be a cycle of
strongly connected components by Lemma V.2. However, this reaches a contradic-
tion because the cycle of connected components would itself be a larger connected
component. Therefore, There must be at least one strongly connected component
with no outgoing edges to other strongly connected components.
For any unsafe instance of SPP, we show how a dispute wheel Π may be
created. It is possible that more than one dispute wheel may be generated by the
procedure. A similar proof was given from [Ref. 12] as Theorem V.9.
A closed walk is a path on a component or graph such that the path visits
every node and edge at least once, and begins and ends with the same node.
Lemma V.4. Let S be an unsafe instance of SPP. S has a dispute wheel.
Proof. Let P be the set of paths which contains the every path P ∈ {R-
paths(u)|u ∈ U}. Let G(P) be the graph induced by taking all the edges and nodes
of the paths of P. Each node u has one or more paths in R-paths(u) and must
have an outgoing degree of one or greater in G(P). Furthermore, consider any node
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v along a path R-paths(u) such that v ∈ O − U . This node must also have an
outgoing degree of at least one in G(P), because it is along a path, and it can’t
be the last node of the path, because that node is in U . By Lemma V.3, G(P)
must contain at least one strongly connected component that contains no outgoing
edges to other strongly connected components. Furthermore, this strongly connected
component must contain at least one node u ∈ U . This is because if it contains a
node v ∈ O−U , this node will have a path to a node in u, which must belong to the
same strongly connected component. Let C be such a strongly connected component
We claim that we can generate a dispute wheel from C. If we conduct a closed
walk on the resulting graph, we will have visited each node u ∈ C ∩ U and each
path P ∈ {R-paths(u)|u ∈ C ∩ U} at least once. We form our dispute wheel by
beginning the walk with an arbitrary node u ∈ C ∩ U which we take to be u0. We
take Q0 = Q-path(u0) and R0 to be the path of R-paths(u) we take first. For each
subsequent node v ∈ C ∩ U , if this is the ith time we have reached a node in C ∩ U ,
we take ui = v, Q0 = Q-path(uk), and finally, we take the next path traveled to be
Ri. This process terminates at the end of our closed walk. We take the last node
reached u to be uk = u0.
We must now show that we have generated a dispute wheel. Clearly, properties
1-3 of a dispute wheel have been satisfied, otherwise those paths would not occur
infinitely often. Finally, for any paths RiQi+1 and Qi, λ
ui(Qi) ≤ λ
ui(RiQi+1), because
otherwise node ui would never switch paths away from Qi because that path is always
available.
4. All Dispute Wheels Robust and Complete Implies
Safety
In the following lemma, we show that there is a time where all paths that do
not occur infinitely often, can no longer be path assignments for any node.
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Lemma V.5 (Flushing Paths That Do Not Occur Infinitely). Let S be an
unsafe instance of the stable paths problem. Let w be a node in V . Suppose that
P 6∈ values(σ,π(0),w). Then there is a time tf after which no finite path of the form
QP belongs in π(t).
Proof. We use proof by induction on the length ofQ. Let Z(i) be the predicate
that there exists a time ti after which no path of the form QP belongs in π(ti) such
that Q has length i .
Base Case. Let i = 0. After time tc, the node w can only update its assignment
to a path in values(σ,π(0),w). Node w is activated infinitely often. Let t0 = tw > tc
be the next time node w is activated which is after the time tc. After time tw = t0
there can be no path of the form QP such that Q has length 0. Z(0) is true.
Induction Step. Suppose Z(i) is true. There exists a time ti after which no
path of the form QP belongs in π(ti) such that Q has length i. Let v be a node such
that π(ti, v) = QP where Q has length i+1. Node v is activated infinitely often. Let
tv > ti be the next time node v is activated. After time tv there can be no path of the
form QP because v can no longer adopt this path. For all v such that π(ti, v) = QP
where Q has length i + 1, let ti+1 be max(tv). After time ti+1 there can be no path
of the form QP such that Q has length i+ 1. Z(i)⇒ Z(i+ 1).
Our predicate Z(i) is true for all i ≥ 0. By the principle of induction, we have
shown that there exists a time t after which no finite path of the form QP belongs in
π(t).
In this theorem, we show that for any path that occurs infinitely often, all
subpaths must also occur infinitely often.
Lemma V.6. For some node u, if P ∈ values(σ,π(0),u) where P = (w0w1...wk)
, then for all wi, P [wi0] ∈ values(σ,π(0),wi).
Proof. If P [wi0] 6∈ values(σ,π(0),wi) and P ∈ values(σ,π(0),u) there would be
a contradiction, because by V.5 the path P should have been flushed after some time
t.
58
In the following theorem we give our main result of this subsection. We show
that for an instance of SPP, if all dispute wheels are robust and complete, then the
instance of SPP is safe.
Lemma V.7. Let S be an instance of the stable paths problem. If every dispute
wheel of S is complete and robust, then S is safe.
Proof. We will use proof by contradiction. Suppose every dispute wheel of S
is complete and robust, but S is not safe.
By Lemma V.4, we know that S must contain a dispute wheel that has nodes
which oscillate infinitely often. Furthermore, we have assumed that this dispute
wheel, Θ(S), is complete. We will show that Θ(S) can not be robust, which will be
our contradiction.
Let the path assignment π(0) and the activation sequence σ be unsafe for
S. We will use induction to show that we can find an initial path assignment and
activation sequence such that SPPΘ(S) is not safe. As usual, let π(i) define the path
assignment at time i for S under the activation sequence σ. Let tf be the time where
all paths have been flushed out of the system as in V.5. Let ¶(i) define the path
assignment for SPP(Θ(S)) with the activation sequence σ for all times i ≥ tf .
At time t = tf , we let ¶(Tf) have the following path assignments. For all
u ∈ Θ(S), let ¶(u, tf) = π(u, tf) . For all w 6∈ Θ(S), these nodes do not occur in
SPP(Θ(S)).
Let Υ(i) be the predicate that at time i the following holds true. For all
u ∈ Θ(S), ¶(u, i) = π(u, i) .
Base Case. At time tf we let ¶(Tf) have the above path assignments, so we
know Υ(i) is true.
Induction Step. Suppose Υ(i) is true. We know that for all u ∈ Θ(S), ¶(u, i) =
π(u, i). Under the activation sequence σ, at time i+ 1 the nodes Ui+1 are activated.
Each node in Ui+1 will be denoted by uk,i+1.
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Suppose uk,i+1 ∈ Θ(S). This activation will cause node uk,i+1 to take the
path π(uk,i+1, i + 1) = best(choices(π(i),uk,i+1,i)). For node uk,i+1, we know that
Puk,i+1Θ(S) = P
uk,i+1
S, because Θ(S) is a complete dispute wheel. Because the next
hop of every availible path is in Θ(S) and by our induction hypothesis, we must then
have choices(¶(i),uk,i+1,i) = choices(π(i),uk,i+1,i) . Therefore, best(choices(¶(i),uk,i+1,i)) =
best(choices(π(i),uk,i+1,i)), and ¶(u,i+1, i+ 1) = π(uk,i+1, i+ 1).
Suppose uk,i+1 6∈ Θ(S). This node does not occur in SPP(Θ(S)). Therefore,
Υ(i)⇒ Υ(i+ 1).
We have used induction to show that the nodes of SPP(Θ(S)) will have the
same sequence of path assignments as π. We can use π(tf) and the subsequence of σ
beginning with the tthf element with all elements uk,i+1 6∈ Θ(S) removed as an initial
path assignment and activation sequence for SPP(Θ(S)) that will cause some nodes
of Θ(S) to oscillate indefinitely. SPP(Θ(S)) is not safe.
However, we have reached a contradiction, because we assumed every dispute
wheels was robust, and thus can’t be unsafe. If every dispute wheels of S is complete
and robust, then S must be safe.
E. A WEAKER SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR SPP
ROBUSTNESS
The following lemma is important for our main theorem.
Lemma V.8. Let S be an instance of the stable paths problem. If every dispute
wheel of S is robust and complete, then every dispute wheel of all subinstances of S
is robust and complete.
Proof. Let S = S = (G,P,Λ) be an an instance of the stable paths problem
where G = (V,E). Let E ′ ⊂ E and SPP(E ′) be a subinstance of the stable paths
problem. Let Π be any dispute wheel of SPP(E ′). Any dispute wheel Π, must also
be a dispute wheel for S, which can be denoted by Θ(S). Because of our assump-
tion, SPP(Θ(S)) is robust. Therefore, SPP(Π) must also be robust, because it is a
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subinstance of SPP(Θ(S)). Therefore Π is a robust dispute wheel. Finally, because
for each node u ∈ Π, PuE′ ⊆ P
u = Pu S SPP(Θ(S)) , Π must also be complete dispute
wheel.
Our main theorem gives our new sufficient condition for robustness.
Theorem V.9 (A Weaker Sufficient Condition for SPP Robustness). Let S
be an instance of SPP. If every dispute wheel of S is complete and robust, then S is
robust.
Proof. We know by Lemma V.8, that every dispute wheel of all subinstances
of S will be complete and robust. Therefore, we know by Lemma V.1 and Lemma
V.7, that S, and all subinstances of S will be uniquely solvable and safe respectively.
Therefore S must be robust.
We believe that the above results are true for SPVP, as well. We believe a
similar inductive proof could be conducted for Lemma V.7 using SPVP. In such a
proof, the sequence of path assignments for nodes of a complete dispute wheel would
be the same as for the same nodes in the total instance of SPP.
We compare our condition for robustness to the existing sufficient condition
for robustness, which is having no dispute wheel. If an instance of SPP has no dispute
wheel, then it satisfies our condition. However, an instance of SPP may satisfy our
condtion, but not the condition of having no disptute wheels. Therefore, our condition
is weaker than the condition of having no dispute wheel. Unfortunately, our weaker
sufficient condition is not a necessary and sufficient condition for robustness because
there exist instances of SPP that our robust, but do not meet our condition.
Consider the instance of SPP given in Figure 22 which we will call “COUN-
TEREX”. This instance of SPP contains the dispute wheel depicted in Figure 19
which we will call ΠCOUNTEREX. However, this dispute wheel is not complete. For
COUNTEREX, the path (1 4 0) is available at node 1. However, for the derived
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instance SPP(ΠCOUNTEREX), the path (1 4 0) can not be available at node 1 because
node 4 does not belong to the dispute wheel. COUNTEREX does not meet our
condition, but we claim COUNTEREX robust. Just because an instance of SPP is
robust, this does not necessarily mean that it meets our condition. Therefore, our
condition can not be necessary and sufficient.
Figure 22. COUNTEREX: A Robust Instance of SPP that Does Not Meet Our
Condition
Figure 23 compares our condition with the condition in previous work.
Figure 23. Conditions to Guarantee SPP Robustness
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F. APPLICATION OF MAIN THEOREM
We have shown that for any instance of SPP, if every dispute wheel is complete
and robust, then the instance is robust. In order to apply this theorem, two steps
must be taken. First, given an instance of SPP, we must find all dispute wheels.
Second, once dispute wheels have been found, we must show that each dispute wheel
is robust and complete.
1. Finding Dispute Wheels
In order to apply our main theorem, we must find all dispute wheels for a given
instance of SPP. In Section I, we introduced Class-Based Path Vector systems as an
abstraction of BGP and SPP that meet well-characterized contraints based upon
the relationships between nodes. Ramachandran and Jaggard gave a centralized
polynomial time algorithm (Algorithm 4.1 [Ref. 18]) that determines all directed
cycles of troublesome classes which correspond to potential dispute wheels. They
proved that their algorithm was complete. They left open the problem of determining
exactly which dispute wheels, if any, occur for a directed cycle. We could take the
troublesome cycle, and make sure that it meets some set of constraints such that if
the cycle does create a dispute wheel, that dispute wheel is robust and complete. An
example of such conditions are given in the next session.
Unfortunately, this approach only works for instances of the stable paths prob-
lem which meet the constraints of class-based path-vector systems.
2. Constraints that Guarantee Robustness Despite the
Presence of a Dispute Wheel
To guarantee robustness for an instance of SPP, all dispute wheels must be
robust and complete. The computational complexity of determining robustness of
general instances of SPP remains an open problem [Ref. 12]. It may be NP-Hard.
Therefore, we would like to develop global and local contraints that guarantee robust-
ness, despite the presence of a dispute wheel. If all dispute wheels for an instance of
SPP followed these contraints, then the instance would be guaranteed to be robust.
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We introduce a set of contraints (“Set A”) on SPP that is guaranteed to be
robust and have a dispute wheel.
“Set A” of Contraints on S = (G,P ,Λ)
1. V = {d, 0, 1, ...n− 1} where d is the origin and n ≥ 3
2. E = {(1 d), (2 d), ...(n− 1 d), (n d), (1 2), (2 3), ..., (n− 2 n− 1), (n 1)}
3. For each node k ∈ V − {d}, Pk = {(k d), (k k + 1 d), (k k + 1 k + 2 d), ...(k
k + 1 k + 2...k − 1 d)}
4. (k d) is the highest ranked path at every node k
5. For all other paths, λk(P1) > λ
k(P2) if P1 is longer than P2.
6. For each node k, k = k + n,
If an instance of SPP meets these contraints, it will contain the dispute wheel
of size n − 1 where ui = i + 1, Qi = (i i + 1 0), and Ri = (i i + 1). The purpose of
“Set A” is to illustrate that there does exist some sets of general contraints, which
guarantee robustness depsite the presence of a dispute wheel.
Theorem V.10. If an instance of SPP meets “Set A” of constraints, then it
is robust.
Proof. We must show that the instance of SPP is uniquely solvable and safe
under any combination of edge removals. If any edge (k k+1) is removed, there is no
possible way the subinstance still contains a dispute wheel, so the subinstance is safe
and uniquely solvable. If all n − 1 edges of the form (d k) are removed, then there
is a unique, safe solution where every node k gets the empty path assignment. We
now consider the cases where between 1 and n − 2 edges are removed, but all edges
of the form (k k + 1) are present. Without loss of generality, we assume the edge (1
d) is present. We use induction on the edges to prove that every node has a unique
solution and is guaranteed to converge to it after some finite number of activations.
Our induction hypothesis Z(i) is that node i has a unique solution and is guaranteed
to converge to its unique solution after some finite number of activations.
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Base Case. Node 1 has the unique solution (1 d) because it is the highest
ranked path and is also always available. Also, node 1 is activated infinitely often, so
it will converge after some finite number of activations.
Inductive Step. We assume that node i has a unique solution and will converge
to it after some finite number of activations. We would like to show that node i−1 also
has a unique solution and will converge to it after some finite number of activations.
Suppose the edge (i− 1 d) has not been removed. This case is the same as the base
case, therefore Z(i− 1) is true. Suppose the edge (i− 1 d) has been removed. After
some finite number of activations, node i will converge to some path P1 = (i [i + 1]
[i+2] ...d). This path can not be (i i+1...i−1 d) because edge (i−1 d) is unavailable.
Therefore, the path (i − 1 i)P1 is available at node i − 1 because of the “Set A” of
constraints. Because this is the only available path, and the path assignment of node
i is unique, the path assignment of node i − 1 must also be unique. Furthermore,
because each node is activated infinitely often, node i− 1 will be activated sometime
after node i recieves its path assignment, so node i− 1 will converge after some finite
number of activations as well. Z(i)⇒ Z(i− 1).
By the principle of induction, all nodes in the subinstance have a unique path
assignment and are guaranteed to converge to it after some finite number of activations
when between 1 and n − 2 edges of the form (i d) fail. Therefore, if an instance of
SPP meets “Set A” of contraints, it is robust under all cases of edge failures.
We compare how “Set A” compares with existing robust operational guidelines.
Because all existing guidelines are based upon an instance of SPP having no dispute
wheels, “Set A” is disjoint from existing guidelines as depicted by Figure 24. Note
that the set of “All Robust Operational Guidelines” does not actually exist, because
no necessary and sufficient condition for robustness has been found.
Clearly, the conditions of “Set A” create a complete dispute wheel. Any dis-
pute wheel generated by these conditions will contain every node and the availible
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paths at every node are contained in the dispute wheel
Figure 24. Robust Operational Guidelines for SPP and BGP
Unfortunately, the constraints given by “Set A,” are too strict. There exist
other instances of SPP that contain robust dispute wheels. We would like to in-
vestigate the most general constraints possible that guarantee the robustness and
completeness of dispute wheels.
In general, our results give could be applied to give BGP operators more flex-
ibility. Operators could follow existing operational guidelines, or they could follow
new operational guidelines that are guaranteed to produce robust and complete dis-
pute wheels. By following either such guidelines, the system of BGP routers will be
provably robust.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have extended previous work on interdomain routing by fo-
cusing on the stable paths problem. In particular, we introduce a new sufficient con-
dition for interdomain routing that guarantees robustness. This condition is weaker
than those previously published. We also compare various models of BGP behavior.
We show that such models do not necessarily have equivalent definitions of safety.
We also show that such models do not necessarily match each other in terms of the
possible path assignments each model may reach for the same instance of the stable
paths problem.
There are still a large number of open problems pertaining to interdomain
routing and robustness. The condition for robustness we have introduced is not likely
to be the most general condition for robustness. Ramachandran conjectured that no
general set of conditions can capture all robust instances of the stable paths problem
(Conjecture 4.5.3 [Ref. 21]). Either a necessary and sufficient condition for the stable
paths problem will have to be found, or this conjecture will need to be proven.
As mentioned in Chapter V, we believe our main results could also be proven
using the simple path vector protocol. A formal proof of this would give greater
confidence that our results can undoubtedly be applied to BGP.
During the research for this thesis, we were unable to prove whether or not
safe (MNASM) implies safe(SPVP). Either a counterexample will need to be found,
or some proof will need to be made.
The problem of devising more general conditions than those given in “Set
A” remains open. These conditions are strict, and it is possible that much broader
conditions based upon our main result could be given. Once broad conditions have
been constructed, it would be useful to convert such conditions to guidelines for BGP
operators.
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APPENDIX. AN EXAMPLE OF A ROUTER
CONFIGURATION
Current configuration : 1289 bytes
!
version 12.1
service timestamps debug uptime

















ip address 10.0.6.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface Ethernet1/0
ip address 10.0.4.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface Ethernet1/1
ip address 10.0.1.2 255.255.255.0
!
interface Ethernet1/2











timers bgp 5 15
redistribute connected
neighbor 10.0.1.1 remote-as 102
neighbor 10.0.1.1 route-map MARGE in
neighbor 10.0.1.1 filter-list 103 in
neighbor 10.0.4.2 remote-as 103
neighbor 10.0.6.2 remote-as 100




ip route 100.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 10.0.1.1
no ip http server
ip as-path access-list 100 permit ^100\$
ip as-path access-list 102 permit ^10
ip as-path access-list 103 deny 103
ip as-path access-list 103 permit .*
!
access-list 1 permit 10.0.1.1
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